University at Albany, State University of New York

Scholars Archive
Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security,
and Cybersecurity Faculty Scholarship

Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security,
and Cybersecurity

5-13-2021

Cyber Third-Party Risk Management: A Comparison of NonIntrusive Risk Scoring Reports
Kevin Matthe Caramancion
University at Albany, State University of New York

Omer F. Keskin
University at Albany, State University of New York

Irem Tatar
University at Albany, State University of New York

Owais Raza
University at Albany, State University of New York

Unal Tatar
University at Albany, State University of New York

The University at Albany community has made this article openly available.

Please share how this access benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/ehc_fac_scholar

Recommended Citation
Caramancion, Kevin Matthe; Keskin, Omer F.; Tatar, Irem; Raza, Owais; and Tatar, Unal, "Cyber Third-Party
Risk Management: A Comparison of Non-Intrusive Risk Scoring Reports" (2021). Emergency
Preparedness, Homeland Security, and Cybersecurity Faculty Scholarship. 2.
https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/ehc_fac_scholar/2

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security, and
Cybersecurity at Scholars Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Emergency Preparedness, Homeland
Security, and Cybersecurity Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholars Archive.
Please see Terms of Use. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@albany.edu.

electronics
Article

Cyber Third-Party Risk Management: A Comparison of
Non-Intrusive Risk Scoring Reports
Omer F. Keskin, Kevin Matthe Caramancion, Irem Tatar, Owais Raza and Unal Tatar *
College of Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security and Cybersecurity, University at Albany,
State University of New York, Albany, NY 12203, USA; okeskin@albany.edu (O.F.K.);
kcaramancion@albany.edu (K.M.C.); itatar@albany.edu (I.T.); oraza@albany.edu (O.R.)
* Correspondence: utatar@albany.edu



Citation: Keskin, O.F.; Caramancion,
K.M.; Tatar, I.; Raza, O.; Tatar, U.
Cyber Third-Party Risk Management:

Abstract: Cybersecurity is a concern for organizations in this era. However, strengthening the
security of an organization’s internal network may not be sufficient since modern organizations
depend on third parties, and these dependencies may open new attack paths to cybercriminals.
Cyber Third-Party Risk Management (C-TPRM) is a relatively new concept in the business world. All
vendors or partners possess a potential security vulnerability and threat. Even if an organization has
the best cybersecurity practice, its data, customers, and reputation may be at risk because of a third
party. Organizations seek effective and efficient methods to assess their partners’ cybersecurity risks.
In addition to intrusive methods to assess an organization’s cybersecurity risks, such as penetration
testing, non-intrusive methods are emerging to conduct C-TPRM more easily by synthesizing the
publicly available information without requiring any involvement of the subject organization. In this
study, the existing methods for C-TPRM built by different companies are presented and compared to
discover the commonly used indicators and criteria for the assessments. Additionally, the results
of different methods assessing the cybersecurity risks of a specific organization were compared to
examine reliability and consistency. The results showed that even if there is a similarity among the
results, the provided security scores do not entirely converge.
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1. Introduction
Supply chains are crucial for the viability of today’s global organizations. With the
high degree of dependencies among organizations, no business processes (i.e., missions)
can succeed without receiving the products or services from third-party organizations [1].
Information and communication technologies (ICT) enable organizations to operate as a
part of this highly interconnected supply chain; however, they also pose the organizations
to cyber risks due to their vulnerabilities [2].
Vendors allow a company to acquire specialist skills and knowledge that can significantly differentiate the value of an organization’s end-products and services. However,
receiving services or products from vendors also increases the risks posed by these vendors’
vulnerabilities. Third-Party Risk Management (TPRM) is the process used by companies
to monitor and manage interactions with all external parties, particularly their vendors.
TPRM has been used for years by companies, but it is relatively new to the cyber domain.
Data breaches have not only been caused by the compromises initiated within a company
but also originated at a business partner, supplier, or other third-party organizations. Such
risks are considered part of the Cyber Third-Party Risk Management (C-TPRM), and this
term can be used interchangeably with vendor cyber risks and cyber supply chain risks.
With an effective C-TPRM, a company can mitigate such vulnerabilities to avoid risks
caused by its dependencies.
The efficiency of supply chains requires organizations to share information and increase interdependencies among their information technology (IT) networks, which signifi-
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cantly increases the attack surface of an organization [3]. According to a report by Resilinc,
the likelihood of a manufacturing organization experiencing a supply chain disruption
in 24 months is more than 98% [4]. Another report by PwC notes that in 2014, current
service providers and contractors were responsible for 23% of all cyber breaches, while
past partners were responsible for 45% [5]. Based on a survey report by Ponemon Institute [6], 56% of organizations have experienced a data breach, and 75% of organizations
have experienced a cyber incident caused by their third-party vendors. While the average
number of third parties with access to a given organization’s sensitive data is 471, merely
one-fifth of the organizations know if their suppliers share their data with any other supplier. Third-party cyber risks are on the rise, while regulations and mitigation techniques
against third-party cyber risks are still in the early stages [7].
The purpose of this study is to examine the C-TPRM solutions available in the market
and compare their results (i.e., third-party risk scores) to assess the reliability and consistency of these risk scores. In this study, we are addressing the following research questions:
1.
2.

What methods are currently used in cyber third-party risk management?
How reliable do different scoring tools calculate the third-party risk scores?

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the previous work on this topic,
including the existing risk analysis methods. Section 3 discusses and analyzes some of the
most significant cyberattacks regarding C-TPRM. Section 4 elaborates the methodology of
the study. Section 5 provides insights on different approaches for quantifying third-party
cyber risks by different companies, the common indicators used for quantification, and a
benchmarking of results by different C-TPRM approaches for a specific higher education
institute. Section 6 presents the results of the analysis. Section 7 discusses the findings of
the study and provides directions for future research. Section 8 concludes the paper by
discussing its contributions.
2. Previous Work
The literature review section comprises a summary of relevant works in the literature
summarizing the methods for calculating the third-party cyber risk.
2.1. Risk Management
Risk is defined by Kaplan and Garrick [8] as a function of probability and consequences of a loss event. This concept applies to cybersecurity risks. Various methods exist
in the literature to quantify the cybersecurity risks that can be chosen or adapted based on
the characteristics of the organization under focus and the threat landscape [9]. Threats and
vulnerabilities are commonly used to estimate the risks [10]. A threat is defined as “any
circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations
(including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals,
other organizations, or the Nation through an information system via unauthorized access,
destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service” [11]. A
vulnerability is defined as a “weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat
source” [11]. Several risk assessment methods exist, including EBIOS, MEHARI, OCTAVE,
IT-Grundschutz, MAGERIT, CRAMM, HTRA, NIST SP 800–30, NIST SP 800–37, NIST
SP 800–39, RiskSafe Assessment, and CORAS [12,13]. The methods and frameworks are
either or both qualitative and quantitative [14,15]. The criteria to select the correct model
include validity, compliance, cost, and usefulness. Most of these methods only focus on the
organization’s inherent risks instead of considering the risks posed by the connections or
dependencies with the organization’s vendors [16].
Organizations utilize various types of methods to assess cybersecurity risks: qualitative, quantitative, and hybrid risk assessment. Qualitative risk assessment is commonly
used since it is relatively easy and faster to conduct. Risk events are identified, and for each
risk, event likelihood and consequences are estimated based on a scale, typically as low,
medium, and high. Finally, they are visualized on a risk matrix (heat map) to prioritize

Electronics 2021, 10, 1168

3 of 19

and determine mitigation actions. However, it is subjective, and the complexity of larger
organizations requires objective and quantified methods. Quantitative risk assessment
can be conducted in a tailored way for each organization based on the characteristics of
the organization’s network. Risk managers, system owners, and system administrators
need to employ models to assess cyber risks. Hybrid methods combining qualitative
and quantitative methods can also be utilized. Cyber risk management frameworks are
provided by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) and the International Standards Organization (ISO). These frameworks [11,17–21]
provide detailed steps for risk management, including lists of security controls to mitigate
the cyber risks. Such frameworks can be adopted by organizations and tailored to assess
cybersecurity risks.
Organizations utilize risk management frameworks as a guide to tailor the risk management best practices to the characteristics of their sector and organization. Multiple
frameworks have been published [22]. Among others, frameworks by the NIST, ISO, and
MITRE are widely used by governmental and private organizations throughout the USA
and the world. Several factors affect the decision on selecting a framework. First, The
ISO/IEC 27000 series [20] is an international standard that provides guidance on establishing a risk management-based information security management system. With its broad
scope, ISO/IEC 27000 can be adopted by any organization regardless of size and sector.
On the other hand, NIST’s cyber risk management publications integrate security and risk
management activities into the system development life cycle. While ISO/IEC 27000 has an
international audience and is adopted worldwide, the NIST guidelines are dominant in the
United States and applied mainly by federal agencies, government contractors, and critical
infrastructure operators. Frameworks developed by MITRE usually focus on vulnerability
and threat management that is an integral part of risk management.
After selecting a risk management framework, an organization needs to adopt it based
on its characteristics. As an example, adopting NIST’s risk management framework is
succinctly explained in this paragraph. Three risk management documents of NIST (i.e.,
NIST SP 800–39, 30, and 37) enables organizations to integrate cyber risk management into
enterprise risk management by providing multi-tiered risk management by examining risk
at the information systems level, business process level, and organizational level instead of
considering cyber risk as a silo. NIST SP 800–30 [19] defines cyber risk as “a function of
the likelihood of a given threat source’s exercising a particular potential vulnerability, and
the resulting impact of that adverse event on the organization.” In compliance with this
definition, NIST SP 800–39 [17] and NIST SP 800–37 r.2 [18] explain how to integrate risk
management process throughout the organization by addressing cyber risks at three levels,
from tactical to strategic order: information systems level, mission/business process level,
and organizational level. NIST SP 800–39 [17] also discusses the effects of organizational
culture on risk management, which is an essential element of ERM.
2.2. Supply Chain Cybersecurity
Trust among the organizations of a supply chain plays an integral role [23]. Relationships based on trust increase cooperation over time, resulting in better responsiveness.
Instrumental in a continuous exchange of materials, information, and knowledge, supply
chains have evolved into complex and interdependent networks. Alongside the risks
stemming from complexity and interdependencies, extensive use of information and communication technologies (ICT) has posed cyber risks to supply chains. Concerns regarding
data privacy also increased along with emerging cyber risks. Trust among supply chain
entities in the era of connectivity evolved since success in supply chain operations does
not ensure the cybersecurity of a network [24–26]. Mitigating cyber risks and addressing
privacy concerns has become an essential step to ensure trust among supply chain entities. Researchers in this field develop new models to address such issues to contribute to
building trust among partner organizations [25,27].
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The integration of ICT with supply chain size and technology heterogeneity has
increased significantly. This requires organizations to deal with a new set of problems that
have not been traditionally existed. Ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
the data and services provided by the ICT network is a challenging task that organizations
need to undertake. While increased connectivity not only helps operations but also opens
new doors to the attackers, every single software and hardware component added to the
network is a potential vulnerability that can be exploited by adversaries. For example,
the introduction of the Internet of Things (IoT) increases the ability to gather much more
information about the process; however, not all IoT designers prioritize cybersecurity [28].
This insecurity introduces new challenges to the network administrators.
Emerging technological developments try to address some of the issues encountered
by supply chain operators. Blockchain technology is an emergent field regarding ICT
networks. The immutability of blockchain technology and smart contracts brings the
ability to provide traceability sought by industries such as food and pharmaceuticals. Even
though blockchain technology can be promising to address some of the issues, there are
still many risks regarding the cybersecurity of the supply chain [25,27–35].
2.3. Supply Chain Cyber Risk Analysis
Cyber supply chain risk management is a relatively new field that combines expertise
in cybersecurity, supply chain management, and enterprise risk management [36]. Early
discussions of the effects of cyber attacks on the supply chain listed and explained different
attack types [37]. Boyson et al. [38] developed a cyber supply chain assurance reference
model. Then, Storch [39] developed a risk-based software integrity management approach.
Supply chain risk management literature mainly focuses on risks related to product flow
and supplier selection. Some literature also considers the financial aspect by adding cash
flow risks to the product flow risks.
Risk assessment is commonly conducted by estimating the likelihood and consequences (impact) of cyber incidents. For the likelihood estimation component of the cyber
risk analysis, identifying and scoring the organization’s vulnerabilities is crucial. Intrusive
and non-intrusive methods are two of the main approaches for vulnerability analysis and
likelihood estimation. Intrusive cyber risk assessment methods are conducted by direct interaction with the subject organization’s network and require their actions. These methods
include network vulnerability scanning, reviewing logs, audits, and penetration testing.
On the other hand, non-intrusive methods are used to assess an organization without any
involvement of the subject. It includes techniques such as checking the subject’s Web site
for outdated certificates, looking up IP addresses of servers of the subject at the botnet
registers, and searching the dark Web for any breached confidential data belonging to the
subject organization. A third method includes conducting a survey-like approach where
a checklist of security controls would be asked from the subject organization to be filled
out to evaluate the security level without conducting any technical analysis. These three
approaches differ in their depth and convenience. Only the non-intrusive methods are in
the scope of this study.
MITRE’s Supply Chain Attacks and Resiliency Mitigations report [40] demonstrates
how cyber threats can pose risks at any phase of the acquisition lifecycle (i.e., material
solution analysis, technology development, engineering, manufacturing development,
production, deployment, operations, and support). The NIST started the Cyber Supply
Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) program in 2008 to “Develop a multi-pronged approach
for global supply chain risk management” by working with diverse stakeholders from
“government, industry, and academia to identify and evaluate effective technologies, tools,
techniques, practices, and standards useful in securing the cyber supply chain.” One of the
significant outputs of the program is NIST Special Publication 800–161 Supply Chain Risk
Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations [41].
McDaniel et al. [42] identified challenges and problems with the cyber supply chain
and developed the Trustworthy Supplier Framework to constitute guidance to minimize
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supply chain security incidents. The purpose of this framework is to assure that the suppliers along the supply chain are trustworthy, and they will make sure that no modification,
whether intentional or unintentional, will occur on the ICT products. The framework is
still being improved; the effectiveness or cost benefits of using this framework have not
been tested yet.
All of these efforts establish a set of principles for a secure and resilient supply chain.
However, organizations still require a practical approach to assess the cyber risks posed by
their partners in the supply chain. This study will benchmark the existing approaches of
non-intrusive third-party cyber risk management in order to investigate the consistency of
the existing approaches.
3. Case Analysis of Infamous Cyber Attacks Regarding C-TPRM
This section discusses how third-party risks can cause cyber incidents by analyzing
five important cyber attack cases: Target, Home Depot, Office of Personnel Management,
RSA Security, and SolarWinds.
3.1. Target
Target data breach is one of the most significant examples of third-party cyber risks
hidden in supply chains. In late 2013, the credit and debit card information of more than
40 million customers along with non-financial details of some 70 million customers were
stolen from Target. Merely reissuing the customer cards cost the banks more than 200
million dollars [43]. Target was also affected as they had to pay $18.5 million in a classaction lawsuit against them, excluding the cost of lawyer fees, as it took about four years
before a settlement was reached [44].
Although Target has been compliant with legal and industry standards, not all companies within their supply chain had a sufficient level of cybersecurity [45]. Attackers used
this opportunity to conduct a successful phishing attack and steal network credentials from
one of the vendors of Target, Fazio Mechanical Services. This small company sells heating,
ventilation, and air-conditioning systems to Target. Then, attackers set foot on Target’s
network via the vendor portal that was meant to be used by the vendors for external billing,
contract, and project management purposes. Attackers moved on to deploy a custom
software called BlackPOS on the point-of-sale systems. The malware had the ability to
scrap unencrypted, plain text data, including PIN codes, within the memory of the POS
terminal before they were encrypted. Having completed developing the malware, the
attackers fully deployed it on the POS machines. The attackers also installed another
malware within the Target network to exfiltrate the data to drop locations outside the
network. The attackers were comfortable enough to test and update the malware multiple
times to improve its operation. Even though the intrusion triggered alerts on Target’s
intrusion detection systems and antivirus software, the security team did not react against
the suspicious activity. The malicious software stored and exfiltrated data, including details
of all cards swiped, within a couple of weeks to the drop locations [46]. The attackers later
retrieved the stolen information and sold it on the black market. After the Department of
Justice informed Target about the attack, the company publicly announced the breach.
After the breach, many analysts concluded that Target had a chance to stop the breach
from happening and limit the number of customers affected. Though not entirely scientific,
a counterfactual approach might help us grasp the matter more clearly: if the computers of
Fazio, Target’s vendor, had had antivirus software, authentication stealing malware would
have triggered the alert and prevented the attack from happening. Additionally, Target
should have segmented their networks to ensure that Fazio and other third parties did
not have access to their payment systems. Moreover, Target’s security team could have
paid attention to the alerts they received from the intrusion detection system regarding
the escape routes the attackers planned to use to exfiltrate data from Target’s network to
prevent the data breach [46].
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However, Target did learn from this attack and has implemented some new security
policies to prevent future attacks. One is to keep updated anti-intrusion software and hire a
capable IT team that will monitor the network for any possible malicious activity. Another
additional security policy is keeping their third-party partners at a high standard on their
security controls [45].
3.2. Home Depot
On 14 September 2014, Home Depot, the largest home improvement retailer in the
United States, experienced a massive data breach. Hackers were able to steal more than
50 million credit card numbers from Home Depot customers, along with 53 million email
addresses [47]. Home Depot had to pay at least $134.5 million in compensation to Visa,
MasterCard, and various banks. Furthermore, more than 50 lawsuits were consolidated
into two class-action suits on the consumer front, with the plaintiffs last year awarded
$19 million [48]. Broken down, $13 million was to reimburse the losses of the victims and
$6.5 million to provide them with identity protection services. In addition to those two big
payouts, Home Depot had to pay affected financial institutions an additional $27 million,
in total costing Home Depot $179 million.
Similar to the Target breach, the Home Depot breach resulted from stolen credentials
from one of Home Depot’s vendors (which has not been named). Criminals used a thirdparty vendor’s username and password to enter the perimeter of Home Depot’s network.
However, these credentials were not the only items needed to hack into Home Depot’s
point-of-sale devices [49]. However, the simple credentials were only the small piece
of the puzzle that allowed the hackers to acquire elevated rights that allowed them to
navigate portions of Home Depot’s network. Then, they exploited a zero-day vulnerability
in Windows, which allowed the hackers to deploy a unique, custom-built malware on its
self-checkout systems in the US and Canada. The malware was left undetected for five
months between April and September 2014 [49]. Home Depot, similar to Target, blamed
the supply chain for their breach; however, it was just another example of an inadequate
network sequestration and vetting process.
Although the Target breach happened a year before this attack, this only showed
that retailers need to tighten integration between inventory, teams, and systems. After
the breach occurred, Home Depot did learn from the attack and implemented many
countermeasures to prevent a future breach from happening. The first implementation is a
continuous vulnerability and malicious movement scanning on the corporate network and
POS network. The second implementation was to properly separate network connections
between third-party vendors and the POS network. Last but not least, Home Depot has
created proper monitoring capabilities and management techniques of third-party vendor
identities and access.
3.3. Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
The United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) serves as the leading
human resources agency and personnel policy manager for the Federal Government. OPM
directs employee management services, manages retirement, healthcare, and insurance
benefits, merit-based and inclusive hiring into the civil service, and it provides a secure
employment process [50].
On 15 April 2015, OPM became a victim of a massive data breach. The hackers were
able to obtain millions of standard forms (SF) 86, which contain confidential information
about family members, college roommates, foreign contacts, and psychological information [51]. Such information can be dangerous if in the wrong hands due to the extensive
information these forms have on millions of federal workers. Information on more than
22 million former and current federal employees was affected.
The massive data breach on OPM was primarily the office’s fault. That year, the
agency was accused of having poor cyber hygiene and reduced visibility into the traffic on
its systems. The agency also failed to prioritize cybersecurity; in the year of the hack, OPM
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only allocated $7 million in funding their cybersecurity team [51]. This amount of funding
placed them last on a list of other federal agencies. Due to the lack of funding and cyber
practice, a third-party company working with OPM was breached by the hackers, who
then were able to gain credentials to the OPM network [51]. Since this was not the first
attack OPM experienced, this was the turning point for them to add some countermeasures
to prevent such an attack from happening in the future again.
Two major countermeasures were created. The first is to build or contract an in-depth
auditing program that would contain important information about the vulnerabilities
OPM and its vendors possess. The second countermeasure is to deploy an agency-wide
requirement of multi-factor authentication on end-user accounts.
3.4. RSA Security
RSA Security LLC, widely known as RSA, is an American computer and network
security company with a focus on encryption and encryption standards. RSA is one of the
major cybersecurity companies in the United States. Therefore, it was surprising when
RSA came out to the public in 2011 that they had been victims of a cyber-attack. The
hackers were able to extract information from RSA’s IT systems. Specifically, compromised
products include RSA’s SecurID, which consists of a token, either hardware or software,
which generates an authentication code at fixed intervals—for example, once a minute
using a built-in clock and an encoded random key known as a seed [52]. Thus, with this
information, the hackers could reduce the effectiveness of RSA’s two-factor authentication.
This type of information affects not only RSA but also any company that utilizes the twofactor authentication system of SecurID. Overall, the actual cost of the RSA data breach was
confirmed to be around $66 million in direct and attributable costs [53]. It is important to
note that this number does not include the cost RSA customers had to spend to reconstruct
their two-factor authentication systems.
The massive data breach on RSA came to be from three steps. The first step was when
the hacker sent “phishing” emails with the subject line “2011 Recruitment Plan” to two
small groups of employees over two days [54]. Unfortunately, one of the employees clicked
on the email and was directed toward an excel file. At first, the file did not seem to put
RSA systems in danger, but the spreadsheet contained malware that used a previously
unknown, i.e., “zero-day,” flaw in Adobe’s Flash software to install a backdoor [54]. This
malware allowed the hacker to stay hidden from RSA detectors while stealing employee
credentials to use those credentials to get into RSA’s IT system. The third and last step was
spiriting RSA files out of the company to a hacked machine at a hosting provider and then
on to the hacker himself [54].
The RSA case shows that even the top computer and network company in the United
States can be breached from having a vulnerability in one of their third-party products,
which in this case was the Adobe software. Moreover, RSA being a third-party providing
service to several organizations that depend on its compromised security products, many
other organizations suffered losses regarding cyber third-party risks.
3.5. SolarWinds
The SolarWinds hack that occurred in 2020 is a supply chain attack that leveraged
the software update infrastructure of SolarWinds to breach into more than 18,000 organizations’ networks [55–58]. Microsoft’s president identified this as the “largest and most
sophisticated attack” that ever happened, even though the total impact of the attack is
not yet known [59]. While analyzing its sophistication, it is estimated that more than a
thousand engineers worked on the development and execution of the attack [59].
The attack is categorized as a supply chain attack because it leverages the software
update infrastructure that is trusted by the victims. Attackers infiltrated thousands of
organizations’ networks by delivering the malware via compromised software update
servers. SolarWinds Inc. is the developer of a set of software that is primarily used in
network management, making them an excellent target for hackers who want to infil-
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trate organizations’ networks. The attackers use the trust established by SolarWinds to
deliver the malware they developed and do their best to keep it hidden from cybersecurity
practitioners of the victim organizations [55–57].
The success of the attack is also ensured by the efforts of the attackers to keep it hidden.
Although the attack started in March 2020, it was detected in December 2020. Employees
of a cybersecurity company [55,56] that is a victim of the hack identified a suspicious
activity regarding multi-factor authentication. They discovered that an additional phone
was registered for an employee without their knowledge [55,56,59]. Further investigations
led to the discovery of the attack. Among thousands of victim organizations, only one
could reveal the suspicious activity after months.
One reason the malicious codes of the software update are kept hidden is the delayed
execution. Malware waited for 12 to 14 days before execution not to be detected by
automated systems, such as malware sandboxes [55,56]. Large organizations employ such
detection systems to pre-deploy software to check whether any malicious or unintended
consequences emerge.
Another feature that kept the breach hidden is that the malware does not follow
just one way of action [55,60]. Arbitrary actions of the malware make it more difficult
for organizations to detect suspicious activity by comparing the findings of others. For
different organizations, the attackers followed different strategies.
After the backdoor is opened to the attackers from the network of a victim, they
had a view of the network and could further spread within the network. Organizations
discovered that attackers targeted Microsoft Office 365 and Azure Cloud services that
commonly included valuable information for the attackers [60]. They had the opportunity
to escalate privileges to have even more power to manage the network and its components.
They can spread to other connected third-party organizations [60]. Moreover, the impact
is not only limited to information technology (IT) networks, but also the operational
technology (OT) components are possibly at risk. OT includes systems such as HVAC,
power distribution, perimeter sensors, and backup power systems [61].
The total impact of the breach is still not known. At least nine federal agencies and
almost 100 private organizations are identified as victims of the attack, with numerous
affected facilities for each organization [62]. The impact of the attack on each target
organization ranges from minimal to a mystery [63].
This highly sophisticated attack showed that all the vendors we trust are vulnerable
to such high-impact breaches. Organizations have numerous partners, and every single
software used by an organization is a possible attack vector. The tradeoff for organizations
about third-party selection is challenging. Partners with minimal cybersecurity practices
are already at high risk. The high-end organizations are good at cybersecurity; however,
they attract more attention from the attackers since exploiting them would open the back
doors to all their client organizations [64]. SolarWinds breach is not the first of its kind,
and with its high impact, it shows the high potential to new threat actors who would try to
replicate and improve further [60].
4. Methodology
This study presents an exploratory analysis of C-TPRM solutions. In the previous
section, we presented relevant concepts by discussing prior incidents regarding C-TPRM,
providing a summary of existing cyber risk analysis methods.
To set the ground, in the next section, we discuss the solutions of different companies
to quantify cyber third-party risks.
For the data collection and analysis step, we conduct a pilot study for a specific
organization (a US-based higher education institute) with sample C-TPRM risk scores
from four different companies that provide risk scoring services. Firstly, data are collected
by gathering cyber risk reports for the target organization from each of the selected four
companies. Then, quantitative and qualitative analyses are conducted for comparison of
the results to check consistency and reliability. For the quantitative assessment, the risk
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scores are normalized to compare by rescaling the overall risk score provided by each
company to the range of 0–100. Qualitative analysis results of each report are compared
manually. Findings of the analyses are reported in Section 6.3. Triangulation is conducted
to improve the reliability of the research by getting two researchers to conduct the analyses
separately and eventually compare the results.
5. Solution for Quantifying Cyber Third-Party Risks
The main idea behind the C-TPRM solutions is creating a risk score for every company
similar to the personal or company credit scores. In the US, the credit score bureaus
(e.g., Equifax, Trans Union, and Experian) use a standard calculation method utilizing
several factors such as the number of accounts, types of accounts, used credit vs. available
credit, length of credit history, and payment history. Usually, the overall credit scores
from different bureaus for an individual are consistent and converge to a point. In this
section, first, we examine the C-TPRM risk scoring solutions available in the market. Then,
we discuss how these risk scores are calculated and what factors are employed in risk
score calculation.
5.1. Companies and Their Products
Third-party cyber risk management has become very popular after the occurrence
of significant incidents and the emergence of the cyber insurance sector. Cyber insurance
providers need to quickly estimate the risk profile of a buyer for an effective and efficient
underwriting process. Alongside the other factors, third-party (or vendor) risk scores have
become essential tools on which the insurers rely. The demand for third-party cyber risk
scores triggered the supply, and several companies started to respond to this demand.
While there are over ten companies in the cyber risk scoring market, their products differ in
scope, detail, and results. In this section, we examine leading cyber risk scoring companies.
5.1.1. BitSight
BitSight is a cybersecurity rating company that assesses companies, government
agencies, and educational institutions. It is one of the first security rating companies. Since
2011, BitSight has assessed the cybersecurity of more than 200,000 companies [65]. BitSight
assembles models that produce company ratings based on a scale that enables insurers to
rule on businesses’ ability to receive coverage. Similar to a credit score, BitSight’s ratings
range from 250 to 900 [66].
Although most features are comparable to the other companies that provide risk
assessment, BitSight’s strength is the proprietary method of data collection from which
they exclusively own more than 120 sources, both commercial and licensed data that allows
a more specialized insight of key risk vectors, many of which are unique to BitSight’s assessment.
5.1.2. ComplyScore
ComplyScore is an information security and governance solutions provider that helps
organizations comply with existing regulations to keep their systems secure. ComplyScore,
as a solution, performs the integration of risks, compliance, and audit to eliminate redundancies, hence providing the streamlining of processes of organizations resulting in the
highly effective management of compliance and risk [67].
ComplyScore documents the current status of vendors’ information security practices
and assesses the vendors’ compliance with information security policies, including elements of applicable federal and state information security laws. However, it is not intended
to be a certificate of compliance with these laws. Its purpose is to assess the strength of
information security controls that vendors deploy to protect data and serve as a guide to
conduct business with the vendors.
This assessment and the score produced are based on the vendor’s self-declarations
and documentation and not on-site audit. The report includes a description of the gaps
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between vendors’ information security programs and requirements, along with the recommended mitigation steps necessary to close the gap.
5.1.3. FICO
FICO is a well-recognized data analytics company that is focused on credit scoring
services. FICO extends its scoring on Cyber Risk Quantification in the form of the FICO
Cyber Risk Score, which indicates the likelihood that an organization will experience a
cyber incident in the future [68]. The new Chartis Research report Cyber Risk Quantification
Solutions, 2020, named FICO as a Cyber Risk Quantification Category Leader for the second
consecutive year [69].
As a solution, FICO offered its Cyber Risk Score as an empirical score anchored on a
Machine Learning model in determining the risk profile of an organization. The training
sets used to build the model are collected non-intrusively and consist of historical data
that depend on a comprehensive and diverse set of cybersecurity data signals, including
past compromise. FICO utilizes a pre-defined set of indicators to assess the cybersecurity
posture of IT systems, the infrastructures of networks, and the software and services of
an organization.
The score can be used for self-assessment, vendor management, and for the purpose
of external security audits such as cyber insurance profiling.
5.1.4. Interos
Interos was founded in 2005 to help customers understand risk in their multi-tier,
global supply chains. Interos researched and assessed individual suppliers, providing
clients complete supply chain maps, identifying risks, and alerting businesses for issues
that require attention. Interos, unlike many other companies, does not provide a score and
instead provides possible vulnerability indicators. The one thing that differs from most
other companies is that their software is automated by Artificial Intelligence [70].
5.1.5. Recorded Future
Recorded Future is a private cybersecurity company established in 2009. The company
focuses on the gathering, processing, examination, and dissemination of threat intelligence.
Recorded Future uses proprietary machine learning and natural language processing
algorithms to continuously collect and analyze data from the open Web, dark Web, and
technical resources. The measurement results are presented in a range of 0–100 within a
software-as-a-service portal [71].
5.1.6. RiskRecon
RiskRecon was founded in 2015 and has recently been acquired by MasterCard.
RiskRecon’s software as a service for C-TPRM enables enterprises to understand their
vendors’ cybersecurity performance based on continuous assessment of their systems
against 39 security risk criteria. Assessments deliver security measurements, analytics, and
analyst-level insights. RiskRecon uses publicly available data to build the organizations’
security posture modeling to measure their overall security risk [72]. Similar to its competitors, the data gathered are fed into a combination of AI and data-driven technology to
secure cyberspace, particularly toward industries.
RiskRecon provides risk prioritization based on risk event severity and asset value.
The assessment outputs a score between 1 and 10. Contextualization of risk enables
customers to effectively convert RiskRecon assessments into actionable items, providing
capabilities for customers to engage their vendors on the problems that expose them to
the most significant risks. RiskRecon’s strength against its competitors, as they have
claimed, is its high customization—i.e., the solutions provided are custom-tuned to match
an organization’s risk priorities.
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5.1.7. NormShield
NormShield’s cyber risk rating system enables enterprises to measure the probable
financial loss from a cyber attack on a third-party, supplier, or business partner. They
provide a score with a letter grade from A to F. NormShield’s 3D Vendor Risk @ Scale
platform consolidates three types of evaluations to provide more fidelity and streamline
the process of assessing third-party risk. Combining cybersecurity ratings, compliance
checks, and probable financial loss simplifies the complicated process of assessing a vast
amount of third-party organizations. The NormShield provides precise, quantitative, and
regularly updated data to assess and track the cyber risk posture of organizations [73].
5.1.8. Panorays
Panorays Ltd. is following many of the other companies in making their software
automated in risk scoring. Panorays provides a score from 0 to 100. What differentiates
Panorays from other companies is that they provide companies with questionnaires that
companies give to third-party organizations before hiring them. Panorays’ customized
security surveys include only the inquiries that are relevant for each supplier. Panorays
also helps companies ensure that they adhere to regulations and standards such as GDPR,
CCPA, NYDFS, and SIG. This is accomplished with the security questionnaires. Suppliers
can be verified whether they meet the expectations of regulatory measures as well as the
internal policies of the customer company [74].
5.1.9. SecurityScorecard
SecurityScorecard is an information security rating company that evaluates the cybersecurity posture of corporate entities by conducting a scored analysis of cyber threat
intelligence signals for third-party management and IT risk management. Color-coded
letter grades from A to F and numerical scores from 0 to 100 are calculated based upon
the identification of security vulnerabilities on corporate digital assets. Enterprises are
scored on multiple categories of risk such as Web application security, network security,
DNS health, public availability of breached data, IR reputation, mentions within underground hacker chatter, response time for patching, and susceptibility to social engineering
attacks [75,76].
5.2. Common Indicators/Factors Used in Third-Party Risk Assessment
Reports are typically built from data revolving around the possible vulnerabilities in
an organization’s (internal) and the vendor’s (external) system. Different C-TRPM analysis
methods use distinct categories to create a model that generates a cyber risk score. The
following are the general elements primarily included in the assessments:
5.2.1. Endpoint Behaviors
Assessment of endpoint behaviors involves looking for traces that give off cues on
the status of the overall picture, information of security posture, and management of an
organization, including but not limited to access authorizations, asset management, and
audit logging—typically of end-devices.
Typical components scanned include browsers, operating systems, and antivirus
software. This dimension involves assessing the health status of endpoint security by
looking for evidence of endpoint compromise. Scans typically include workstations,
servers, and laptops for any compromise, since these are usually the prerequisites of a
medium-to-massive-sized data breach. As for the widely accepted scale and industry
reference, the Real-time Blackhole Lists (RBLs) are published reporting on confirmed or
suspected malicious activities (such as spamming or malware distribution) originating from
the endpoints of a network maintained by the broader security community. The underlying
argument is that the communication in the protocol stack initiates and ends on these hosts,
highlighting the importance of securing these through Intrusion Detection/Prevention
Systems [77].
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5.2.2. Network Misconfigurations
Assessment of network misconfigurations involves the configurational errors made by
an organization against the current best practices regarding networking devices, including
but not limited to network security management such as port status, unused active IP
addresses, and unsecured redundancies.
Typical components scanned include virtual ports, the PostgreSQL Database, and SSL
certificates. This vulnerability factor revolves around networking and network-security
devices such as firewalls, routers, hubs, and switches. Furthermore, this area includes
assessing routing protocols implemented in these networking devices, the update version
employed, configuration enabled, and the phase-out of legacy protocols such as RIPv1 and
IGRP. Although applications of advanced techniques in dynamic routing protocols such as
Route Poisoning, Split Horizon, and Holddown have the capability to increase security,
they can be a risk factor when improperly configured on these networking devices and
their respective IP routing tables [78].
5.2.3. Software and Services
The ability of an organization to manage the software and services housed at both end
and internetworking devices are assessed, including but not limited to patches, protocols,
and proper configuration.
Typical components scanned include HSTS preloading, CMS, and X-XMS. Details and
metadata about the patch histories of the firewall devices, endpoint hosts, and network
devices have an impact on the scoring. Network scanners typically capture the operating
system versions of these devices and compare them against an updated Masterfile, the
National Vulnerability Database, which is maintained by the security community [79].
This factor further involves the matching/compatibility check of the hardware resources
against the demand of software in a network—as any mismatch can drive a device down
(e.g., device exhaustion) and in turn becomes a risk (i.e., through the Energy Resource
Exhaustion Attack) performed on devices that can cause network outages and halts in
organizational operations [80].
5.2.4. Web Domains
Assessment of Web domains involves tracing the vulnerabilities of an organization’s
primary Web domain and content management systems. It includes Web accessibility,
encryptions, site certificates, and controls that promote higher security.
Typical components scanned include FTP, HTTP, IP addresses, and DNS data. The
vulnerability factor revealed in this section comes from the combination of data extracted
from Domain Name Servers (DNS), ICMP responses, Web servers’ presence (e.g., remote
login servers), and email server port 250 s reliable listening. Further included herein is the
operation assessment of DNS ports TCP/UDP 53, which ensures that all externally visible
DNS servers are essential and not a result of a misconfiguration. Unprotected responses
may indicate the presence or absence of a device on the Internet and may pose a risk of
unethical probes. These have the potential to be misused by attackers for reconnaissance
and should be disabled to the most considerable extent possible [81].
5.2.5. Firmographic Information
Information about an organization’s business, including financials, size, and other
related categories, is considered in assessing firmographic information. Included herein
are the possible surface risk for social engineering and reconnaissance-based attacks.
Typical components scanned include leaked company emails, official Web Sites, information leaks. A wide breadth of data sources may reveal attached organizational details
and allow the mapping of crucial vendor management tasks—both of which are assessed
in this vulnerability category since data that are set to public (typically firmographic information) can be shared in the Dark Web. Although the mere setting of these data to the
public does directly cause a breach, when IP scans and reconnaissance can easily detect
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this information, it can all yield insights about organizations that can be a precursor to a
breach [82]. The approach of the cyber risk scoring model is sensitively conservative in
the sense that while many of these indicators are not necessarily a causal factor of breach
themselves, the very possibility that it may be used as a means to actual breach events can
be a risk factor. Although a baseline exists, there are variations in scoring structure—which
are sourced from the different industry standards, requirements, and regulations of sectors
such as education, health sectors, and finance [83].
5.2.6. Historical Breaches
The corpus of past breaches involving an organization that has been reported is sought.
Furthermore, it includes the assessment of the historical response undertaken against such
incidents to promote business continuity.
Typical components scanned include Typosquat domains, system logs, and patch
versions. In retrospect, an organization’s security history is vital because threat assessors,
insurers, involved partners, and attached vendors may use it to assess how an organization manages threats and performs risk mitigation. The argument is that threat may
be communicative—in the sense that an organization is non-atomic and can pass on its
cyber risk to its partners and be an attack surface in lieu of its affiliated organizations [84].
This vulnerability factor highlights the importance of a good record in risk response and
knowledge management that pertains to cyber risks. Similar to financial credit history, this
dimension is highly used to determine and predict an organization’s most probable future
ability to respond to risk, including novel and unprecedented ones, through a historical
data-driven analysis [85,86].
6. Analysis and Results
In order to analyze the consistency and reliability of C-TPRM solutions, we conducted
an analysis by gathering and comparing a set of C-TPRM reports generated by different
companies for a specific organization.
6.1. The Inclusion Criteria of Cyber Rating Companies
For the inclusion criteria, the risk-scoring companies considered for inclusion in this
study are all members of the Third-Party Risk Association (TPRA). Among the eligible
ones, inquiries are then sent to the companies to confirm if they perform cybersecurity
evaluations. Ten are formally invited to perform an analysis on the security posture of
the test subject. Of the ten companies invited, only four (e.g., FICO, BitSight, RiskRecon,
and ComplyScore) agreed to provide a non-intrusive scan report. The others require a
placement fee prior to score assignment or prior to performing a non-intrusive scan.
6.2. Data Collection
Three of the rating companies performed a demonstration that displays the current
security landscape of the subject except for FICO. This is supplemented with a hypothetical
after scenario (how the score would be improved) once their solution and recommendations
have been applied. Note that the rating ComplyScore assigned from the non-intrusive
scan is just a part of their complete package, which involves an on-site exploration and
investigation of mostly more intrusive methods, all of which will transcribe after an
agreement (paid) has been reached. BitSight and RiskRecon both required live synchronous
demonstration prior to the score placement of the subject. Among these, only FICO almost
instantly gave the rating without any human interaction, only requiring details of the
subject organization’s name and Web site. Furthermore, the turn-around time is measured
from the day the invitation was sent up to the report was acquired (Table 1).
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Table 1. Comparison of methodologies and reports.

Upfront Scan Cost
Report Structure
Demonstration Required
Turn-around Time

FICO

BitSight

RiskRecon

ComplyScore

Free
Full
No
Instantaneous

Waived
Full
Yes
3 days

Waived
Full
Yes
1 week

Free
Partial
No
2 weeks

6.3. Results
This section provides a summary of the comparative analysis for the results of a set
of C-TPRM reports generated by different companies for a specific subject organization.
Each company has a distinct approach to offer: particularly, the comprehensiveness of
FICO, the exclusive benchmarked datasets of BitSight, the highly customized scoring of
RiskRecon, and the management locus of ComplyScore is distinguished. As the subject for
the non-intrusive assessments, the University at Albany scored differently in the evaluation
of each of the C-TPRM platforms (Table 2).
Table 2. Comparison of summary of results for the University at Albany.

Max Points Possible
Score Garnered
Interpretation
Normalized Score
Solution Pricing

FICO

BitSight

RiskRecon

ComplyScore

850
482
High Risk
57%
Subscription

900
540–570 (Range)
Basic-Bottom 30% of Education
60–63%
Subscription

10
6.8
Bottom 20% of Education
68%
Subscription

100
80
B (Letter Grade)
80%
Subscription

6.3.1. FICO’s Report
FICO reported the lowest score for the subject as their model tests the organization
against use cases that involves a collection of highly diverse cross-sectional measurements.
As per metric scale interpretation, the subject belongs to the group with the highest risk of
experiencing a data breach. The score stemmed from considering the poor performance of
service and configuration risk of the poorest network prefix. This includes a high number
of devices or services that have been observed responding to TCP, UDP, or ICMP probes.
Moreover, the subject displayed evidence that the content of Web resources may be out of
date or misaligned with current privacy standards and regulations.
6.3.2. BitSight’s Report
With a small degree of deviation, BitSight reported a slightly higher risk score. The
subject again consistently scored low on endpoint behaviors, i.e., access device tests.
BitSight reported that spam propagation and botnet infections are highly likely to occur
and that some devices are potentially exploited. Likewise, Web resources consistently
contributed to the low performance, mainly due to poor Web headers, unsecured open
ports, and out-of-date SSL certificates. Interestingly, the SSL configuration score was
interpreted relatively high within the specific industry to which the subject belongs, in this
context—education.
6.3.3. RiskRecon’s Report
The report issued by RiskRecon also resulted in poor performance of Web applications
of the subject. The subject specifically scored 2.2 out of 10 for Web applications, and as per
suggestion, it requires immediate halt and re-assessment on this domain. Issues for this
component are primarily attributed to HTTPS security headers and content management
authentication problems. Surprisingly, and as a counterargument for BitSight, the subject
scored high (8.6/10) for the Web encryptions component, with an industry average of 8.2.
From the 810 pre-defined tests, only 40 issues were found. These tests include certificates
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and encryption protocols. On the other side of the spectrum, the subject scored perfectly
(10 out of 10) on data loss events (i.e., historical breach) and threat intelligence (i.e., the
possible state of current compromises inside the organizational system).
6.3.4. ComplyScore’s Report
Finally, ComplyScore reported the highest score on the subject. However, this evaluation is only an initial score generated, as ComplyScore performs a rigorous assessment
before a final score can be awarded on the organization since their primal locus is management and compliance of an organization against current standards, laws, and benchmarked
security policies. As per the supporting documents, their risk assessment is built around
a questionnaire supplemented by telephonic conversations or email correspondence as
necessary. The subject scored poorly due to possibly unpatched Web Servers and Operating
Systems. The Trustworthiness score is 100/100—with the implication of no infections
in the past 12 months, although a spam zero-day is detected five years back. However,
an important disclaimer on the report is that the validation of any special contractual
requirements is not part of the scope of this assessment.
Based on three out of four different C-TPRM reports, it is seen that the subject organization is determined as high risk and ranked at the bottom of the education sector.
Only the results of ComplyScore provide a high score for the subject organization, and it is
explained as due to their primal locus being management and compliance.
7. Discussion
C-TPRM is a relatively new but developing and high-demand concept in the business
world, especially in line with its utilization in the cyber insurance sector. Today, every
vendor or partner organization possesses a potential security risk. Even if an organization
has the best cybersecurity in the world, its data, customers, and reputation are at risk of
suffering a cyber incident caused by a third party.
In this research, we gathered the existing methods for C-TPRM developed by different
companies, presented the commonly used indicators and criteria for the assessments, and
compared the results of different methods for a specific organization. Seminal findings
include the revelation that variations exist in the assessment by the different cyber risk
scoring companies. Moreover, this study attempted to trace where these inconsistencies
are sourced. This article’s findings suggest that these are significantly sourced from the
differences in evaluation methodologies, the inclusion of proprietary datasets, and consideration of additional risk factors beyond the common baseline and metrics. There is a
need for standardization from data collection to risk score calculation to have reliable and
consistent results similar to credit scores.
The significance of this article is through its contribution to the research stream of
Cyber Risk Predictive Modeling. Findings indicate that more analyses that include CTPRM reports for a larger sample of multiple subject organizations should be performed
to evaluate the consistency of the scoring companies through statistical tests further to
reach a common ground. Certainly, a high degree of uniformity in ratings among the
different risk scoring companies would suggest the stability of C-TPRM as a whole. The
practical significance of this study is the awareness it brings to the key people involved
in acquiring security scoring for their organizations—that not a single security rating will
dictate the current state and picture of the security posture of an organization. Furthermore,
this article suggests that companies should consider having their security landscape be
assessed by more than one rating company for a more thorough picture of their security
posture relative to the industry to which they belong.
8. Conclusions
The emergence of C-TPRM has certainly filled in the gap where it is needed the
most—the need for an empirical, data-driven assessment of an organization’s current
security landscape. This is significantly due to the need to estimate an organization’s
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unit risk—the risk an organization carries by itself. When an organization, typically
functioning as a vendor, is connected to other organizations, it can proliferate that unit
risk to its attached organizations. However, the current state of C-TPRM dictates that
more improvement can be made to maximize its potential—particularly in the area of risk
scoring, the methodologies it is anchored on, and the convergence of the datasets used.
Further research is required to assess, more accurately, the reliability and consistency
of C-TRPM scores produced by different companies. This analysis is essential to show
if a score is a reliable indicator of risk posed by a vendor. To conduct a reliability and
consistency analysis, first, we need a larger dataset of risk scores for different companies.
As shown in Table 2, the data are in a qualitative form (a report) and have different
representations. In order to compare and analyze data in various formats, this data should
be coded in a quantitative form and normalized. Normalization eliminates the units of
measurement for data and enables us to compare data from different sources using the
same scale. Later, normalized data should be analyzed using statistical techniques. To
analyze the consistency of overall risk scores, ANOVA can be used. To compare overall
scores by considering the factors used for overall risk score calculation, MANOVA will be
helpful. For each of these analyses, post hoc tests should follow. This comparison analysis
can also help create a risk score equation, which will be based on weighted risk scores
obtained from selected risk scoring companies.
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